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How To Explain Oppression: 
Criteria of adequacy for normative explanatory theories* 
 
Ann E. Cudd 
 
Violence – their enslavement enforced through rape, beatings, or threats – is 
always present.  It is a girl’s typical introduction to her new status as a sex slave.  
Virtually every girl interviewed repeated the same story: after she was taken to 
the brothel or to her first client as a virgin, any resistance or refusal was met with 
beatings and rape.1 
 
I. Introduction 
                                                          
1 Kevin Bales, Disposable People, Berkeley: University of California Press,1999, p.59. 
 Oppression is a morally laden term. Oppression is necessarily an injustice; it is, to put it 
in a Rawlsian formulation, the fundamental injustice of social institutions.  As with Rawls’ 
treatment of justice, I maintain that oppression must be understood not only conceptually but 
also empirically.  To understand oppression, we need an empirical account of oppression that 
can tell us why it happens, how it is manifested in different times and places, and how it has been 
resisted or how it has proven resistant to reform.  Thus, in dealing with oppression, as with some 
other moral and political concepts such as justice, equality, welfare, and opportunity to name 
four others, we need an empirical theory of a fundamentally normative concept.  This is not an 
unusual circumstance for a social scientist, but it is somewhat atypical, if not quite unique, for a 
political philosopher.  I want to argue that the political philosopher studying oppression can gain 
from attention to goings on in the philosophy of social science, while at the same time arguing 
that the social scientist studying oppression can learn crucial lessons for her enterprise from 
political philosophy.  My concern in the present paper is to explore how the empirical theory of 
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the fundamentally normative concept of oppression should proceed. 
 As I will use the term, “oppression” names a social injustice, which is to say that it is 
perpetrated through social institutions, practices, and norms on social groups by social groups.  I 
call this the group condition.  In this way oppression differs from many kinds of injustices that 
can be done to individuals as well as to social groups.2  One can be enslaved as an individual or 
as a member of a social group, as one can be unjustly exploited as an individual or as a member 
of a social group, but oppression is a social injustice and happens to one only as a member of a 
group.  Since oppression is a kind of injustice, an injustice suffered by whole groups of persons, 
it often wrongs widely and deeply.  Although oppression afflicts whole groups of persons, it is 
fundamentally the individuals in those groups who suffer.  In the case I began the paper with, 
women as a group are oppressed by the flourishing of the brothels, but it is the individuals who 
are suffering.  As I shall explain shortly, social groups are aggregates of individuals, though of a 
special, non-accidental sort.  Thus it is individuals who suffer the injustices of oppression, 
though they can only do so as members of social groups.  It is because humans sort themselves 
into social groups and find it nearly impossible as well as undesirable to extract themselves from 
social groups that they can oppress each other. 
  Oppression is a harm through which persons are systematically and unfairly or unjustly 
constrained, burdened, or reduced by any of several forces.  I call this the harm condition.  
Harms are inflicted by both psychological and material forces of oppression.  Psychological 
forces oppress one through one’s conscious mental states, that is, emotionally or by manipulation 
of one’s belief states so that one is psychologically stressed, reduced in one’s own self-image, or 
otherwise psychically harmed.  Material forces oppress by harming one’s physical being, or 
reducing one’s material resources, including wealth, income, access to health care, or rights to 
                                                          
2 I give a full account of this theory of oppression in Analyzing Oppression, unpublished 
manuscript.  A preliminary version of that account can be found in "Oppression by Choice", 
Journal of Social Philosophy, 25 (June 1994): 22-44. 
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inhabit physical space.  Either force may be subjectively recognized or not by its victims.  
Psychological and material force of oppression mutually cause and exacerbate the effects of each 
other.   
 Many contemporary accounts of oppression attempt to define it simply by the harms that 
oppressed persons suffer. But this will not work because of the third condition that I argue 
characterizes oppression, namely the coercion condition.  The harms of oppression are unjustly 
inflicted.  Oppression is a normative concept that names a social injustice.  Oppression is 
always wrong; one cannot coherently speak of justified oppression, though some forces that 
characteristically constitute oppression may, in some instances, be justifiable.  For instance, 
degradation or humiliation is sometimes claimed to be the characteristic harm of oppression, but 
one might be degraded and humiliated by one’s own actions while on a drinking binge, and in 
this case the degradation and humiliation might be entirely justified.  Further, although 
oppression surely is a denial of freedom, it cannot be just any denial of freedom, since some 
constraints on one’s freedom are natural or even social but not unjust.  (Think of someone justly 
convicted of a crime and then jailed for it.)  The injustice of oppression, I claim, stems from a 
coercively enforced inequality or diminished choice.  Thus to make a claim of oppression is to 
show that the harms involved are unjustified, or correlatively, to show that some harms are 
justified is to show that they are not oppressive.  But to see whether harms are unjust, one needs 
to examine the causal mechanisms by which the oppressed come to suffer them.  A complete 
account of oppression has to characterize not only the harms of oppression, but also the causes of 
those harms.  Thus, my account of oppression concentrates on how the oppressed come to suffer 
inequality, limitation, and dehumanization, among other harms. 
 On my view of oppression, for every social group that is oppressed there are correlative 
social groups whose members gain materially or psychologically from the oppression.  I will 
call the groups whose members gain from the increased social prestige and privileges that their 
membership confers on them “privileged” groups, and thus call this the privilege condition.  
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This term, rather than “oppressor group”, avoids asserting that the majority of persons in those 
groups perpetrate oppression by intending to gain unjustly from their actions (or omissions).  
Even if one is a member of a privileged group, one need not oneself be an oppressor, on my 
view.  One could, for instance, struggle against the social system from which one gains through 
one’s group membership, even if one is powerless to renounce that membership.  To be an 
oppressor one needs to be a member of a privileged group, to gain from oppression of another 
social group, to intend to so gain, and to act to realize that intention by contributing to the 
oppression of the oppressed group from whose oppression one gains. 
 Summarizing the definition: Oppression names an objective social phenomenon which is 
characterized by: 
 1. the harm condition: individuals are harmed by institutional practices (e.g., rules, laws, 
expectations, stereotypes, rituals, behavioral norms);  
2. the group condition: individuals suffer harm in (1) because of their membership (or 
perceived membership) in a social group; 
3. the privilege condition: there is another social group that benefits from the 
institutional practice in (1);  
4. the coercion condition: there is unjustified coercion or force that brings about the 
harm. 
The definition allows us to classify cases, although this is sometimes a tricky interpretive 
enterprise, which is loaded with normative claims.  Nonetheless, this cannot be avoided because 
of the moral imperative to avoid harms of this type.  We cannot avoid it just because it is hard or 
risky or unpopular.  There clearly exist oppressed social groups.  A short list would include 
women, Blacks, gays and lesbians, transgendered persons, the disabled, the elderly, and children.  
The correlative groups, men, Whites, straight persons, able-bodied and normally intelligent 
persons, and non-elderly adults are privileged persons and are not oppressed qua members of 
these groups. 
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 Oppression is a puzzling phenomenon in several respects.  Although individual humans 
differ considerably by size and strength and innate intelligence, they do not differ greatly in these 
respects by social group.  That is, within social groups there tends to be much greater variation 
than between social groups.  This is even true between gender groups – the variation in size and 
strength is much greater within the group than between the means of the two groups.  For both 
Hobbes and Rousseau, the rough natural equality of human beings made the existence of 
domination something of a puzzle: how, if we are roughly equal in natural endowments, could 
one person allow herself to be dominated or enslaved by another?  Hobbes, for whom 
oppression connoted conditions of violence and enslavement, argued that in the absence of a 
sovereign power to keep the peace, what he termed the state of nature, the rough equality of 
humans led to the war of all against all, and consequently a “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and 
short” life.  Thus, he argued, we must enter civilized society, that is, accept the domination of 
the sovereign, in order to avoid even more disastrous domination and violence.  “Fear of 
oppression,” he wrote, “disposeth a man to anticipate, or to seek aid by society: for there is no 
other way by which a man can secure his life and liberty.” (Hobbes, 1985, p.163)  Rousseau, 
who thought of oppression as conditions of enslavement and domination, specifically denied that 
oppression is possible in the state of nature, however.   
A man could well lay hold of the fruit another has gathered, the game he has 
killed, the cave that served as his shelter. But how will he ever succeed in making 
himself be obeyed? And what can be the chains of dependence among men who 
possess nothing? If someone chases me from one tree, I am free to go to another; 
if someone torments me in one place, who will prevent me from going elsewhere? 
Is there a man with strength sufficiently superior to mine and who is, moreover, 
sufficiently depraved, sufficiently lazy and sufficiently ferocious to force me to 
provide for his subsistence while he remains idle? He must resolve not to take his 
eyes off me for a single instant, to keep me carefully tied down while he sleeps, 
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for fear that I may escape or that I would kill him.  (Rousseau, 1987, p.58) 
For Rousseau, oppression requires the ability for one person to do the work of two and the 
artifice of money, or a way to store wealth, and these require society.  Also, according to 
Rousseau, oppression could only exist when the oppressed was willing to give up his freedom for 
some merely apparent reward, a reward that only so-called civilized humans could see as better 
than freedom. 
Citizens allow themselves to be oppressed only insofar as they are driven by blind 
ambition; and looking more below than above them, domination becomes more 
dear to them than independence, and they consent to wear chains in order to be 
able to give them in turn to others.... inequality spreads easily among ambitious 
and cowardly souls always ready to run the risks of fortune and, almost 
indifferently, to dominate or serve, according to whether it becomes favorable or 
unfavorable to them. (Rousseau, 1987, p.77) 
Oppression then becomes stable and accepted by the institution of laws: “it derives its force and 
growth from the development of our faculties and the progress of the human mind, and 
eventually becomes stable and legitimate through the establishment of property and laws.” 
(Rousseau, 1987, p.81)   
 Though Rousseau thinks it a relatively easy matter to explain oppression as a result of 
cowardice and ambition, the depth of the harms and their longstanding nature suggest to me the 
need for a more detailed causal account.  I offer the following as a list of the questions that an 
explanatory theory of oppression should answer. 
 How does oppression originate? 
 How does oppression endure over time (in spite of human’s rough natural equality)?   
 How do institutional structures of oppression form? 
 Is oppression an inevitable feature of civil society?  
And finally, if we are to have any hope for a better future for humanity: 
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 How can oppression be overcome? 
The most difficult and interesting of these questions is the endurance question: How does 
oppression endure over time in spite of human’s rough natural equality?  An answer to this 
question will lead to answers to the others.  To answer this question theorists have always had to 
show how the oppressed are made to participate in their own oppression rather than resist it.  So, 
for instance, Rousseau claimed that vanity perverts persons’ desires, so that they prefer material 
goods to freedom.  Hegel claimed that it is capitulation in the face of death.  Marx wrote about 
how the oppressed come under the sway of “false consciousness” and are motivated to 
participate in the economy out of fear of starvation.  And Mill claimed that it is the force of 
social mores that indoctrinate us into our societies’ traditions from childhood.  I believe that 
none of these are adequate answers, though each contains a grain of truth.3  
 These questions all demand social scientific investigation, to provide an explanatory 
framework that allows us to explain oppression and figure out how to overcome it.  This is not a 
purely scientific enterprise, however.  At minimum, what it means to overcome oppression is an 
exercise in the philosophy of freedom.  Theories of oppression and freedom occupy a special 
place at the intersection of social science and philosophy.  They rely on social scientific theories 
of human nature, human capacity, and the limits of social engineering.  They rely on empirical 
investigations of biology, psychology, anthropology, economics, politics, and evolution.  They 
rely on the kind of conceptual work that Locke articulated in his famous underlaborer conception 
of philosophy.  But they also rely on moral investigations and theories of human rights.  Thus 
the social scientist who eschews moral claims as simply out of her realm of expertise or even as 
inappropriate moralizing is not well equipped to investigate oppression.  Likewise the moral or 
political philosopher who thinks that conceptual clarification does not require deep empirical 
investigation of the social world is not well enough informed to make judgments about the 
                                                          
3 In Analyzing Oppression, ch. 1 I take a detailed critical view of these historical theories of 
oppression. 
How to Explain Oppression A.E. Cudd – p.8 
possibilities of human social life.  I will argue in the remainder of this paper that philosophy of 
social science can aid in the project of finding an adequate account of oppression by specifying 
the criteria of adequacy that such a theory must meet.  
 Competing theories of explanation of oppression come from several social scientific 
orientations.  Perhaps best known are the functionalist dialectical theories of Hegel and Marx, 
and their intellectual descendants.  Psychologists have offered a number of useful theories, most 
comprehensive of which are psychoanalytic social theory, social learning theory and most 
recently social dominance theory – a species of evolutionary psychology.  In this paper I will 
argue that these theories fail to meet the criteria of adequacy I posit, and that a structural rational 
choice theory can be constructed to account for oppression, and will argue that it best meets the 
desiderata of such a theory. 
 
II. Criteria of adequacy for explanation 
 In this section I argue that there are four different types of criteria that apply to 
explanatory theories of normative concepts: ontological, theoretical, pragmatic, and moral.  That 
there are moral criteria distinguishes this kind of explanatory enterprise from explanatory 
theories of purely descriptive concepts.  However, moral criteria, and to some extent pragmatic 
ones, invite a variety of criticisms that the resulting theory will be too value laden to be 
persuasive.  I respond to these criticisms, as well. 
II.1 Ontological issues 
 My concern in this paper is with explanation, but this methodological concern inevitably 
raises ontological issues about levels of analysis and the ontological status of the entities that are 
posited by the theories.  In my view, the appropriate ontology should be developed within the 
explanatory theory, that is, we should posit those entities needed for successful explanations.  
Still, some preliminary ontological principles can be discussed within those boundaries.  I agree 
with the basic principle of ontological parsimony, that one’s ontology should be as parsimonious 
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as possible, consistent with the ability to answer the kinds of questions that the theory is devised 
to answer.  The reason for this conservatism is that without it we risk making ad hoc 
explanations through the positing of extraneous causal forces and entities.  Ontological 
parsimony refers to the types of entities and forces, and counsels reduction when possible.  This 
principle is also related to the principle of theoretical unification: that all other things equal, a 
unified theory with broad scope across a wide variety of phenomena is good.  The ontological 
implication of this is that we ought to posit the same kinds of forces and entities for as broad a 
scope of phenomena as possible. 
 My definition of oppression might seem to imply a collectivistic ontology, because social 
groups are included in the definition as the subjects of oppression and the beneficiaries of 
oppression.  It might seem that from the very beginning my account would violate the principle 
of parsimony if another definition can be devised that does not refer to social groups.  However, 
I define social groups externally: social groups are composed of persons who share a set of social 
constraints on their actions.   Social constraints help to explain individual actions by revealing 
the incentives that individuals have by virtue of their membership in non-voluntary social 
groups.4   Because social groups are ontologically reducible to individuals and their mental 
states, social groups in my sense do not introduce any ontological extravagance. 
 A second ontological principle to which an explanatory theory should subscribe is causal 
fundamentalism.  This is the claim that the causal relations of macro-levels supervene on causal 
relations of micro-levels. Recent debates in philosophy of social science have focused on the 
question of whether causal fundamentalism has any implications for explanation, in particular, 
whether it implies some sort of methodological individualism.  In my judgment the debate 
                                                          
4 Social constraints affect individuals’ actions through the penalties and rewards that one can 
reasonably expect from them. Stereotypes, norms, rules, laws, social conventions comprise the 
social constraints that individuals face, and they are in turn ultimately composed of the mental 
states of individuals.   I defend this sort of account of social groups in  "Non-Voluntary Social 
Groups", Groups and Group Rights, edited by Christine Sistare, Larry May and Leslie Francis, 
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001, pp. 58-70.  
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confirms that it does not.  Jon Elster argued for methodological individualism on ontological 
grounds.5  He begins by distinguishing among levels of explanation by the “fineness” of the 
grain of the causal structure proposed by a theory.  A theory is said to be finer grained if the 
causal connections are closer in time (close grain) or among smaller objects packed closer in 
space (small grain).  Jackson and Pettit summarizes Elster’s argument for methodological 
individualism as follows.6   Premise 1: To explain is to provide information on the causal 
history of what is to be explained.  Premise 2: We provide better information on causal history 
as we identify smaller grain and therefore greater detail in the relevant causal structure. 
Conclusion: As we identify smaller degrees of grain in relevant causal structure, we provide 
better explanations.  Jackson and Pettit deny premise two by first showing that it is subject to a 
regress argument: if true, we should regard micro-physical level explanations as superior in all 
cases.  But that means that there is no explanatory information that could be given by biologists 
or chemists, let alone economists or social theorists.  Surely for questions such as “why did the 
U.S. invade Iraq?” that is absurd.  This objection needs to be expanded upon to show just what 
the absurdity is, and I shall do this when I come to explain pragmatic criteria, but it seems to me 
compelling.  Second, Jackson and Pettit argue against methodological individualism directly by 
showing that social questions can require structural explanations, that is, explanations that refer 
to social facts.  Their example is that to explain a rising crime rate by referring to rising 
unemployment rate is a better explanation (assuming that it is true) for some legitimate 
explanatory purposes than by looking at each criminal and explaining why he or she turned to 
crime.  The essential information that the former gives us but the latter does not is the 
information that the conditions of unemployment give individuals a powerful motivation, which 
is overridden in some individuals but becomes activated in others, to turn to crime.  Thus even if 
                                                          
5 Jon Elster, Explaining Technical Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. 
6 Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, “In Defense of Explanatory Ecumenism”, Economics and 
Philosophy, 8(1992):1-22. 
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a particular individual had not become a criminal, say because she was hit by a car just before 
the crime would have happened, enough others would be motivated to commit crimes to still 
constitute a rising crime rate.  This macro-level explanation reveals the contrast between a high 
unemployment and a low unemployment society (all other things equal) to explain the higher 
crime rate.   
 Now it has been pointed out by Uskali Mäki that Jackson and Pettit’s argument was made 
in terms of particular individuals.7  While it is true that the information about why a particular 
individual is not employed is not useful for making the essential contrast, the information about 
an abstract individual would be just as useful.  Mäki concludes that we are therefore justified in 
requiring methodological individualism after all. But what is the information about an abstract 
individual that we require to make the right explanation?  If it is that the likelihood that the 
individual will be unemployed, then the reference to a macro-level fact comes in again.  Is 
unemployment just a micro-level fact in shorthand?  I think not.  If it were, then the rise in 
individuals’ likelihood to commit crime should be proportional to their likelihood of being 
unemployed throughout the range of probabilities. But I think it is rather a step function relation.  
If there is high unemployment, that is, high above a certain ‘step’, then the general anxiety about 
unemployment will rise, and this will make for a greater motivation to commit crime.  This does 
not make unemployment an emergent cause of crime; it is still composed of unemployed 
individuals, and it is a motivating factor that works through individual mental states.  But there 
is a point at which unemployment becomes widespread enough in a society to play a direct 
causal role in individuals’ mental states, and not just a role through the likelihood of the 
individual’s own employment status. 
 What then, is the upshot of causal fundamentalism for explanatory theories of social 
phenomena?  I believe that it implies that any entities postulated must be seen to supervene on 
                                                          
7Uskali Mäki, ‘Explanatory Ecumenism and Economics Imperialism,’  Economics and  
Philosophy, 18(2002): 235-257. 
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the causal connections of ever smaller and closer in time individuals.  But that does not imply 
that only the micro-level entities can play a role in the best explanatory theories.  Jackson and 
Pettit’s arguments do not imply that we should seek out higher level explanations at all times.  
There are many times when an explanation that reaches one level down in the causal structure is 
a better explanation in some of the senses that I will describe below.  So, individualism is to be 
valued where it is useful.  I propose, then, the weaker regulative principle of causal level 
parsimony: causal connections posited by the theory should be as close in time as possible and 
smallest grain possible consistent with meeting the other explanatory criteria   
II. 2. Theoretical explanatory desiderata 
 The second type of criteria of adequacy for an explanatory theory are theoretical criteria, 
which I take to be well-traveled ground for philosophers of science.8  The first criterion is that 
of empirical responsiveness: scientific theory should be responsive to evidence, in the sense that 
it should be able to accommodate a wide range of evidence, but it should not insulate itself from 
all possible counterexamples.  Now it is commonly held that there is no such thing as 
non-theory-laden data,9 and unexamined auxiliary assumptions may always be lurking that will 
either hide potential falsifying data, or trick us into thinking that a good theory has been 
falsified.10  Given the complexity of the causal relations in and the multiple realizability of 
macro-phenomena, falsification is even more difficult in the social sciences.  However, if a 
theory simply defies falsification, making ad hoc adjustments at every turn to accommodate any 
                                                          
8 A classic source is Carl G. Hempel,  "Valuation and Objectivity in Science" in Physics, 
Philosophy, and Psychoanalysis, Robert Cohen, ed., Dordrecht: Reidel, 73-100. 
9 Two sources of the argument for this claim are: Wilfrid Sellars, “Empiricism and the 
Philosophy of Mind,” in Science, Perception and Reality,  London : Routledge & K. Paul ; New 
York : Humanities Press, 1963; Helen Longino, Science as Social Knowledge, Princeton, 1990, 
ch. 4. 
10 This is just the well known Duhem-Quine thesis.  See Pierre Duhem, Aim and Structure of 
Physical Theory, trans. by Philip P. Wiener,  Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1954;  
W.V.O. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” in From a Logical Point of View, 2nd ed., 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961. 
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possible evidence, then the theory is unacceptable.  A theory that seems to explain all possible 
outcomes explains none.  This criterion of adequacy cannot be considered an absolute rule, then, 
but only a guideline for theories, a desideratum. 
 The second basic theoretical desideratum is the idea that the theory should fit with nearby 
theories; that explanations of one level of phenomena should be consistent with, and mutually 
inform, levels of phenomena above and below it.  I take this to be the principle of theoretical 
unification.  For example, molecular geneticists attempt to make their theories consistent with 
both theories of population biology and organic chemistry.  Aiming for unification serves both 
aesthetic and epistemic goals.  When an inconsistency between levels is found there is reason to 
believe that one of the theories is false.  That gives us reason to look for a theory that can 
accommodate the phenomena in a seamless way with other theories. 
III.3. Pragmatic criteria 
 The third type of criteria of adequacy for explanatory theories are pragmatic criteria, 
which are the criteria that judge a theory by its usefulness.  Under this category I include two 
different subcategories.  First there are what I will call theoretically pragmatic criteria.  
Explanations, as was emphasized by Bas van Fraassen, are fundamentally answers to why 
questions.11  Why questions can only be parsed by paying attention to the contrast classes they 
presuppose.  For example, the question “Why did the U.S. invade Iraq in 2003?” might be 
parsed as at least four different questions depending on whether the relevant contrast class is the 
U.S. vs some other entity, Iraq vs. some other country, invade vs. some other action, or the year 
2003 vs. some other time.  For some questions, determining the relevant contrast class will 
determine the appropriate explanatory theory to provide.  For example, if it is asked “why did 
Ann go to St. Louis?” the relevant answer might require reference to philosophy conferences and 
the close relation between philosophers and social scientists – a high level macro-social 
                                                          
11 Bas van Fraassen, The Scientific Image, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980, ch.5. 
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explanation.  Or it might require an explanation of how cars work and what combinations of 
movements of pedals and levers and switches, etc. caused the car Ann was driving to go to St. 
Louis rather than, say, Denver.  The kinds of questions that I claim are important to ask about 
oppression will also have important implications for which theories will and which will not meet 
this theoretically pragmatic criterion, as I shall argue in the next section. 
 The second type of pragmatic criterion might be called axiologically pragmatic.  It 
proposes that a good explanatory theory must offer techniques to manipulate the phenomena 
under investigation.  This is a particularly important criterion for explanatory theories of 
normative concepts.  A theory of oppression, I want to argue, must give us possible resolutions 
of oppressive institutions: either ways to alter or to eradicate them.  This criterion differentiates 
theories of oppression from theories of many other social phenomena.  For example, a theory of 
religion need not show us how to get rid of (or support) it; a theory of revolution need not show 
us how to avoid it; a theory of a particular social practice need not show us how to eradicate or 
support it.  The topics that require social science explanation that must answer to this 
axiological criterion are the necessarily morally laden ones: justice, oppression, equality, 
welfare.   
 One might object that there will be disagreements about what counts as justice or 
oppression or equality, particularly the kind of equality that is normative.  If there are 
disagreements about whether some state of affairs counts as normatively good or bad, then there 
will be disagreements about whether that state is to be brought about or eliminated.  So, the 
objection concludes, the theory should simply tell us what it takes the concept to be and how the 
phenomena that fit under the concept come about, and leave the manipulation of the phenomena 
to social policy makers.  That is, the theory should be insulated from and not required to offer 
policy recommendations.  Welfare economists, for example, tend to take this approach.12 There 
                                                          
12 William J. Baumol, Welfare economics and the theory of the state, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 1965. 
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are two responses to be made here. First, note that an explanatory theory of any concept should 
define the concept correctly to pick out the right cases.  If it can be argued that the theory fails 
on this ground, then that is a serious objection to the theory.  Yet it must also be remembered 
that a theory is useful in part because it allows us to see some phenomena as falling under a 
concept that might have been overlooked or categorized in another way.  So in disputed cases it 
has to be decided whether the phenomenon falls under the concept or not.  The dispute can be 
settled by asking whether including the new phenomenon allows one to make better explanations 
than those previously available, where better is judged in terms of the ontological and theoretical 
criteria described above.  Normative cases, it seems to me, are to be settled in a way similar to 
what is done when the boundaries of descriptive cases are challenged, and that is by appeal to a 
combination of the principle of theoretical unification and empirical evidence.  But there is no 
way to say in advance which criterion should override: unification or the objections of those who 
point to the use of the term as their evidence that the concept does not apply in a particular 
case.13  The second response is that while there may be disagreement at this level of theory 
construction, once a theory has picked out a set of cases that it proposes as the right cases, it is 
making the claim that these states are necessarily bad (or good).  Clearly the theory that shows 
how the bad can be altered or the good encouraged is a better theory than one that merely tells us 
which is which. 
 To this point I have said nothing about the relative importance of these criteria of 
adequacy. In the case of explanatory theory of descriptive phenomena, empirical adequacy is 
                                                          
13 In the case of the term “oppression”,  Edmund Burke objected that the term was 
inappropriately extended when used to refer to what he argued were royal prerogatives.  In in 
“On the Revolution in France,” he writes: “After destroying all other genealogies and family 
distinctions, they invent a sort of pedigree of crimes. It is not very just to chastise men for the 
offences of their natural ancestors; but to take the fiction of ancestry in a corporate succession, as 
a ground for punishing men who have no relation to guilty acts, except in names and general 
descriptions, is a sort of refinement in injustice belonging to the philosophy of this enlightened 
age.” 
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generally accepted as the most important criterion.  Empirical theories should track the truth, 
and the best measure of whether the theory tracks the truth is whether it makes good predictions 
and generally fits the data. With normative concepts, however, I want to suggest that a good 
theory must track the good and the right in order to track the truth, and once the good and the 
right are properly tracked there will inevitably be implications for action.  What I mean by 
tracking the good and the right is that an explanatory theory of a normative concept should pick 
out the right cases to condemn (or support).   This is as much an empirical as a normative task, 
because it must get the empirical facts right about states of affairs and their consequences for 
human life in order to determine whether states that can be described in a particular way are to be 
condemned or supported.  But the normative task cannot be subsumed under the empirical 
because there are foundational normative premises to be supplied by the theorist.  Once the right 
cases falling under the concept have been determined, there is a prima facie case for action.  
Since normative concepts carry this responsibility for action, a good explanatory theory of a 
normative concept should prescribe some action to perform.  Normative concepts can compete 
with each other for priority, and so the responsibility to act in the way the theory describes may 
not in some cases override other more compelling normative concerns.  Equality and liberty are 
good examples of such competing normative concerns.   
II. 4. Moral criteria 
 The final type of criteria of adequacy of explanatory theories of normative concepts that I 
want to argue for is a moral criterion: theories of human social phenomena must treat human 
individuals as morally primary and the account of the normative concept has to be consistent 
with that assumption.  In particular, they must not treat social groups as having a prior moral 
claim to the individuals that compose them.  The justification of this tenet is that it is the human 
individual who ultimately lives, thinks, bears responsibility for action, feels pain, and dies.  In 
short, only the individual can be a moral agent, and this capacity for moral agency makes 
individuals the primary moral subject.  I take this criterion to be lexically prior to the others.  
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This criterion will surely be controversial on at least two grounds.  One might object to there 
being any moral criterion of adequacy for scientific theories at all.  Second, one might grant that 
there could be moral criteria, but that this is not the right one.  I take these in turn.   
 First, I claim that moral criteria are appropriate for explanatory theories of normative 
concepts.  The basic reason for this is that just as the scientific requirements of the explanation 
of the empirical facts of the phenomena cannot be overlooked, so the moral requirements of the 
normative theory must be taken into account.  One objection to moral considerations in 
scientific investigation is that they will infect observations with a particular normative 
perspective, and may prevent the theorist from seeing a social practice as falling under the 
normative concept or trick the theorist into seeing a social practice as falling under a concept that 
does not belong.  For example, it has been argued that western feminist theorists misunderstand 
the nature of female genital cutting as oppressive, when in fact it is an expression of female 
solidarity in some cultures.  The assumption that the individual has moral primacy has led 
feminists to take the girls’ lack of free choice to refuse genital cutting as a sign of an oppressive 
practice.  The western feminists are mistaken, so the objection goes, since they fail to recognize 
the constitutive nature of the practice as providing an identity for the girls as members of their 
community and gender group.14  However, I grant that the practice provides identity and is a 
deeply embedded practice of the community, and I grant that the social theorist should observe 
this.  The challenge posed by the moral criterion is rather to the value of that identity as opposed 
to the value of the moral primacy of the individual.  In my view nothing can be of greater moral 
value than the individual for the reasons I stated above.  However, if it could be shown that the 
identity conditions created by female genital cutting are such that the moral primacy of the 
individual is upheld, then that practice could be seen as not oppressive by a good explanatory 
theory of oppression.  The example shows that the question of whether the theory is right to 
                                                          
14 Leslye Obiora and Cheryl Johnson-Odim, “African Female Circumcision: Two Academic 
Views,” African Newbreed, April, 1994, p.10. 
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treat this as an oppressive practice can only be answered by appeal to a moral criterion. 
 A more extreme version of this objection is that there can be no objective moral 
judgments, that all moral judgments are subjective or relative to a community.  Some cultural 
anthropologists have claimed that moral relativism follows from the fact of cultural relativism, 
which is simply the fact that there are many different moral standards in different communities.15  
Moral relativism, however, clearly does not logically follow from cultural relativism; it is 
perfectly consistent with cultural relativism to claim that all or most communities have the wrong 
moral standards.  Furthermore, to infer from cultural relativism to moral relativism would 
license the inference of epistemic relativism, as well, and that would leave the theorist with no 
place to stand from which to make either epistemic or moral claims.  This is an unacceptable 
position, in my view, for a scientist to have to take, since it is self-defeating. 
 The second objection is to the substance of the criterion.  The moral primacy of the 
individual is the basic tenet of liberalism, and it would be beyond the scope of this paper to 
provide a full defense of liberalism.  I will offer just two additional considerations in favor of 
this criterion.  First, human individuals possess special capacities, which Rawls called the two 
moral powers of personhood, that are morally special and justify our claims to equal dignity and 
respect.  Human individuals are capable of forming a conception of their beliefs and interests, 
reflecting about those beliefs and interests, refining them in light of criticisms and higher order 
principles, etc.  Human individuals are capable of deep emotional bonds.  Social groups do not 
possess these capacities and the morally significant properties that they have are relative to the 
benefits they offer individuals.  Second, although the requirement is substantial, it does not 
narrow down the list of acceptable theories unacceptably.  Assuming the moral primacy of 
human individuals still allows many normative theories to compete besides liberalism (Marxism, 
for example, is not excluded) and there exist many competing varieties of liberalism that would 
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imply different conceptions of oppression.  What is excluded would include fascism, some 
forms of socialism, and a communitarianism that sets the interests of communities above the 
interests of their members. 
 Now we can summarize the criteria that I have argued for in this section that apply to 
explanatory theories of normative concepts: 
1. Ontological criteria 
Ontological parsimony: ontology should be as parsimonious as possible, consistent with 
the ability to answer the kinds of questions that the theory is devised to answer 
Causal fundamentalism: macro-level causes supervene on micro-level ones 
 Causal level parsimony: causal connections posited by the theory should be as close in 
time as possible and smallest grain possible consistent with meeting the other explanatory 
criteria. 
2. Theoretical desiderata 
Empirical responsiveness: scientific theory should fit data, and should not insulate itself 
from all possible counterexamples. 
Theoretical unification: explanations of one level of phenomena should be consistent 
with, and mutually inform, levels of phenomena above and below it. 
3. Pragmatic criteria 
Theoretical pragmatism: theory should provide relevant answers to the questions. 
Axiological pragmatism: theory must offer techniques to manipulate the phenomena 
under investigation 
4. Moral criterion 
Primacy of human individual: human individuals must be taken to be morally primary. 
I claimed that the moral criterion is lexically ordered above the others, and that axiological 
pragmatism is of particular importance for theories of normative concepts.  I take causal 
fundamentalism and theoretical pragmatism to be non-negotiable requirements on all scientific 
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theories, but that causal level parsimony may sometimes be loosened in order to meet the 
requirement of theoretical pragmatism.   The other criteria are not lexically ordered and the best 
theory may involve making a tradeoff among two or more of them.  That is, a theory that meets 
the criteria of empirical responsiveness well may not be as theoretically unifying as another, and 
yet still be a superior theory on other grounds. 
 
III. Which theories of oppression are condemned by these criteria? 
 We now have a clearer picture of how to judge competing theories of oppression.  In the 
remaining space I will use the criteria I have developed to pare down the list of acceptable 
theories, and to argue in favor of one kind of theory for explaining oppression, namely structural 
rational choice theory. 
 Functionalist (but not all structural) explanations violate the ontological criterion of 
causal fundamentalism.  A functionalist theory is a theory of social phenomena that claims that 
society is a system with some stable equilibrium state that returns the society to that state when 
forces act to move it away.  The forces that move society away from and return it to that 
equilibrium state act on social groups, but are invisible to or at least unintended by the 
individuals involved.  Thus the system is seen to have an internal logic that accounts for the 
explicandum, and the explicandum is both the cause and consequence.  Jon Elster explains that 
functional explanations take the following logical form: An institution or a behavioural pattern X 
is explained by its function Y for a group Z iff: (1) Y is an effect of X; (2) Y is beneficial for Z; 
(3) Y is unintended by the actors producing X; (4) Y – or at least the causal relation between X 
and Y – is unrecognized by the actors in Z; (5) Y maintains X by a causal feedback loop passing 
through Z.16  Elster criticizes most uses of functionalism in social science because the feedback 
mechanism referred to in condition (5) is typically just assumed and not shown.  The main 
                                                          
16 Jon Elster, op.cit., 55-68. 
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exception to this is the explanation of profit maximization among firms in the competitive 
market.  In this case the feedback mechanism is a social analogue of the feedback mechanism in 
evolution by natural selection: non-profit-maximizing firms are eliminated by the market as they 
either go bankrupt, get new management or are taken over by more profitable firms.  The 
feedback mechanism is the force that is supposed to return the society to the equilibrium state.  
Thus it is a critical element of the explanation.  
 An example of a functionalist theory of oppression is Hegel’s (and more recent Hegelian) 
recognition theories.17  On this theory oppression is the failure of a social group to be accorded 
the dignity and respect due to free persons.  The struggle for recognition among social groups is 
played out on analogy with the master/slave dialectic, which has a common pattern. First a slave 
(dominated class) is exploited and treated disrespectfully, then there is a life and death struggle 
between the slave and the master (dominated and dominant class), and finally the struggle leaves 
the slave (dominated class) with the recognition of the master (dominant class), and the class 
structure is rearranged to form some new master and slave classes.  Enduring oppression is thus 
functional for the progress of the development of society, which is progressive in the sense of 
increasing recognition of social groups.  Now this theory violates the ontological principle of 
causal fundamentalism, in that it posits forces at the social level that are emergent from the 
individual level, that is, there is no posited causal connection between the social force of the 
struggle for recognition and the individuals that compose the society.  The force of change is 
posited to arise from the mere fact of oppression. 
 
 Elster discusses the example of Foucault’s explanation of social discipline by means of 
the penal system to illustrate another version of this problem with functionalism.18  Foucault 
                                                          
17 An example is Cynthia Willett, Maternal Ethics and Other Slave Moralities, New York: 
Routledge, 1995.  Another is Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, trans. by Joel 
Anderson,  Cambridge, Mass. : Polity Press, 1995. 
18 Jon Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality, Cambridge, Cambridge 
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explains the maintenance of discipline in the society by reference to the penal system and its 
ability to divide the society into delinquents and normal persons, even after the prison sentence is 
served.  However, there is no agent who is posited to have designed the system for this 
consequence, rather the consequence is supposed to explain its own maintenance.  Thus there 
seems to be some lurking social force involved, yet of indeterminate origin and grain. 
 Can it be shown that all functionalist theories of oppression violate causal 
fundamentalism?  I want to claim that they face a dilemma: either the functionalist theory can be 
shown to work through the production of a feedback mechanism, or it must postulate an 
emergent social force.  For a functional explanation to explain the endurance of oppression, a 
feedback mechanism to maintain oppression must be one that either curtails resistance to it or 
replaces one oppressed group by another, as would be required in the Hegelian case.  Since 
social life does not typically contain the kind of selective feedback mechanism that evolution 
provides, it is hard to see what that mechanism would be.   Although I cannot rule out all 
possible functional explanations, those that fall back on emergent social forces are ruled out by 
the ontological criterion of causal fundamentalism.  When there is an identifiable feedback 
mechanism, it is this mechanism, rather than the function served by the explicandum, that should 
be pointed to as the explanation. 
 Psychoanalytic explanations violate theoretical desiderata: they are not responsive to 
empirical evidence, and offer no fit with other social scientific theories.  Psychoanalysis 
purports to explain behavior by invoking the psychic connections and mechanisms of the 
unconscious that are inevitably formed through the innately pre-programmed pyschosexual 
development of the young child.  All psychoanalytic schools thus attempt to explain the 
puzzling, apparently irrational, so-called pathological, features of our behavior by showing that 
repressed unconscious urges are being satisfied or unconscious fantasies are being played out 
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through the behavior in question.  Since oppression, if it is not rooted in clear hierarchies of 
ability, seems to involve social pathology on the part of both oppressed and oppressor, a natural 
application of psychoanalytic theory is to attempt to explain oppression.   
 Psychoanalysis has received so little positive empirical corroboration, however, that most 
philosophical defenders of the theory concede defeat here and now claim that it is a hermeneutic, 
not a scientific, enterprise.19  As Jane Flax, a defender of psychoanalysis, puts it, the goal of the 
therapist and patient “is not ‘truth’ in the empiricist sense of what ‘really’ happened to the 
patient, but rather understanding which includes a powerful affective and experiential 
component.”20  But even on these grounds the theory is in trouble.  First, as Adolf Grünbaum 
meticulously and convincingly argues, Freud himself did not intend the theory to be merely an a 
priori narrative of meaning but a scientifically grounded psychological theory.21  We may 
simply want to say that Freud was mistaken on this.  Second, to take psychoanalysis seriously as 
a hermeneutic theory, we need to ask what criteria of adequacy it would offer as a defense of the 
claim that it is the best theory of behavior of its kind. I can see two such criteria being 
(implicitly) offered: first, the resonance test: does the story that is offered to the patient resonate 
with her experience, or does the theory offered to explain some cultural feature resonate with 
those who live in the culture (or its descendant culture)?  and second, the coherence test: does 
the theory cohere with the facts as it describes them, that is, can it weave together the facts in a 
plausible connected narrative? These tests are certainly necessary tests of the initial plausibility 
of a theory, but they are hardly sufficient to give us good reason to believe them.  The resonance 
test applied by individuals to their own experience is quite subjective, as it asks one to introspect 
                                                          
19 A good example of this is Jane Flax “Psychoanalysis and the Philosophy of Science: Critique 
or Resistance?”  Journal of Philosophy 78(1981): 561-569. 
20 Flax, ibid., p. 566. 
21 Adolf Grünbaum, The foundations of psychoanalysis : a philosophical critique, Berkeley : 
University of California Press, 1984. 
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about intersubjectively non-verifiable aspects of one’s personal experience.  Hence, hardly a 
reliable scientific test, though possibly a starting point to test for initial plausibility.  At the level 
of social theory a psychoanalytic narrative seems to be open to intersubjective test, since there 
are so many persons in the culture who could pass judgment on it.  But this turns out not to be 
the case if the theory is postulating some sort of general psyche of the culture, since in that case 
no one person is the subject, the culture is the subject.  The coherence test is a more reliable test, 
however.  Granting for the sake of argument that the narrative is coherent, i.e., that it posits a 
narrative that plausibly ties the facts of psychological development together, the issue that one 
must address in assessing the theory is whether it is the best theory.  Coherence is a thin thread 
by which to hang a theory; it does not restrict the range of competitors much.  Are there other 
coherent narratives that plausibly explain the same facts?  And if there are, do these theories 
have anything else going for them that the psychoanalytic theory does not offer?  Are they 
empirically testable, coherent with well tested or otherwise more acceptable theories of 
neighboring phenomena, more fruitful scientifically or for progressive politics?  Do they rely on 
less dubious assumptions?  Since I believe the answer here is a clear ‘yes’, I will move on. 
 Evolutionary psychology poses perhaps the most persuasive alternative theory of 
oppression.  One recent version is the social dominance theory of Jim Sidanius and Felicia 
Pratto.22  I challenge this theory on theoretical, axiological pragmatic, and moral criteria.  
Social dominance theory claims that a person’s social dominance orientation is the basic 
motivation to dominate others, and the social dominance orientation can be predicted from one’s 
social group identity.  Social dominance orientation is elevated in those groups that are 
dominant, because it helps them to legitimate their domination both within the group and to 
members of dominated groups.  Social dominance orientation is also always elevated in men 
over women, and this is explained on evolutionary grounds: it is held to be adaptive for men to 
                                                          
22 Jim Sidanius and Felicia Pratto, Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy 
and Oppression, Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
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be dominant so that they can maximize sexual access to females, while females have no 
corresponding evolutionary incentive.  Males will tend to display violence toward outgroup 
males because it is evolutionalriy adaptive to maximize sexual access of one’s own group -- a 
kind of sexual altruism.  Thus men will tend to form ingroups to monopolize sex with as many 
women as possible. Since violence toward women would be adaptive only so far as required to 
force her to submit sexually, the kind of social dominance that is displayed toward women by 
men is supposed to be less violent than that toward men not in the dominant group. Furthermore, 
since men have no incentive to treat outgroup women differently from ingroup women, the 
double jeopardy hypothesis of feminism – that minority women suffer a double dose of 
oppression – will be contradicted by SDT. 
 First, on theoretical grounds, it seems to me that the prediction that men will not be 
extremely violent toward women is falsified by the facts.  Violence against women is severe and 
pervasive.  The young women in the Thai brothels that Kevin Bales studied were severely 
beaten and then repeatedly raped.23  This violence went far beyond what would be required 
simply to rape them; it had to be enough to terrorize them and put them in a state of permanent 
psychological submission to their sexual commodification.  There are many more examples.  
Rape is a common weapon of war.  Women in Muslim and Catholic countries are subject to 
“honor killings”; women in India are beaten and killed for failure of their families to pay 
adequate dowries; women all over the world are treated violently by their domestic employers to 
keep them under control.  Amnesty International has recently proclaimed violence against 
women to be a plague on civilization around the world.  Women are subject to different forms 
of violence than men are, not because they are potential sex partners but because they are more 
vulnerable, less likely to respond violently, and valuable commodities.  The evolutionary 
explanation seems wanting on this score.  Furthermore, the double jeopardy hypothesis can be 
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verified if it is viewed from the perspective of gender and race – in that order.  While Sidanius 
and Pratto argue that there is no double jeopardy because there is less dominance between 
dominant and subordinate females than between dominant and subordinate males.  This 
comparison thus involves first dividing by gender and then by racial/ethnic grouping.  But if the 
comparison is made in the opposite direction, first by race/ethnicity and then by gender, the 
dominance reappears between males and females.  One good example of this is the gender and 
racial wage gap in the U.S.: there is a greater gender wage gap than racial wage gap, although 
among subordinates the gender wage gap is smaller than among Whites.24  But this could easily 
be accounted for by the existence of a wage floor but no wage ceiling.  Or take the example of 
Thai girls subject to being sold or kidnaped for work in the brothels.  Here it is the father 
dominated families who are selling the girls or male pimps who are kidnaping and beating the 
girls.  Both fathers and pimps come from subordinate groups in Thai society, yet it is clear that 
they are subject to less violence as a group than their women, whom they treat with extreme 
violence.  So the SDT theory seems weak on evidential grounds. 
 I also challenge SDT on axiological pragmatic grounds.  Since it explains oppression by 
reference to innately programmed tendencies to dominate, it is hard to see how that could be 
changed or eradicated.  SDT proposes that oppression is a constant feature of human society.  
That may be the case, but it offers no prescription even for particular cases to end oppression.  
Even the appeal to justice or moral grounds for debate is seen on this theory as an attempt at a 
“legitimizing myth” which if successful would allow the dominated group to turn the tide against 
                                                          
24 The National Committee on Pay Equity reports the average earnings broken down by race and 
gender as follows:  White men$38,869 100%;  White women$28,080 72%;  Black 
men$30,409 78%;  Black women $25,117 64 %;  All men $37,339: All women $27,355 Total 
gender wage gap 73%. (http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0197814.html, accessed on 10 March, 
2004) Since Black men have a lower wage gap than White women, while Black women have a 
higher wage gap than either White women or Black men, it seems that there is clearly a double 
jeopardy for Black women. 
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their oppressors, rather than as a truly progressive move beyond domination.25 
 Finally, SDT violates the moral criterion because it does not assume any moral view. 
Dominance and social hierarchy are equated with oppression.  As a result, SDT cannot 
distinguish between different kinds of social dominance, some of which might be morally 
legitimate.  This failing is related to the one mentioned previously: if oppression does not carry 
normative force, then it need not propose any action to eradicate it.  SDT cannot simply add a 
moral theory to it, however, that distinguishes dominance analytically from oppression, since the 
social dominance orientation that explains the maintenance of dominance is itself caused by 
dominance.  That is, dominance in the non-normative sense is the fundamental explanatory 
feature of oppression.  Thus where SDT theory finds dominance, it posits oppression.  Sidanius 
and Pratto are quick to note that their theory is not intended as an apology for oppressive 
behavior.  But there is little doubt that it can and will be taken that way by those in power.  
Their theory appears to suggest that dominance of various sorts is inevitable, in particular, that 
there will be some arbitrary set dominance and that men will dominate women.  In the minds of 
many, including policy makers, inevitability is not far from justifiability.  As Philip Kitcher 
argued, a theory with potentially grave moral, political or social consequences needs even greater 
evidential warrant to justify it.26  In the case of SDT, such evidence is not to be found.  As 
Lynn Hankinson Nelson, who advances similar arguments puts it: “There is no excuse for failing 
to meet standard norms such as explanatory power, for ignoring relevant and obvious 
counterexamples, and/or for misrepresenting the status of the hypotheses to which one appeals.... 
When the hypotheses generated carry significant implications for social policy and/or human 
self-understanding and aspirations, as do may of those advanced in evolutionary psychology, 
such research is appallingly irresponsible.”27   
                                                          
25 Jim Sidanius and Felicia Pratto, op.cit., ch. 4. 
26 Philip Kitcher, Vaulting Ambition,  Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 1985, pp. 8-10. 
27 Lynn Hankinson Nelson, “The Descent of Evolutionary Explanations: Darwinian Vestiges in 
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IV. Defending structural rational choice theory 
 Finally, I want to argue that there is a theory of oppression that meets the criteria of 
adequacy for an explanatory theory of a normative concept.  The structural theory of rational 
choice28  assumes that the social environment systematically rewards and punishes behaviors by 
members of specific social groups and thereby induces a preference structure on (most) 
members. Thus the structural theory of rational choice assesses the objective social rewards and 
penalties that are consequent on their (inter)actions and their social status and uses these 
assessments to impute preferences and beliefs to individuals based purely on their social group 
memberships.  Stereotypical beliefs, that attach to members of groups regardless of individual 
characteristics, play an important role in the structural theory as imputed beliefs. For example, a 
norm of feminine passivity means that women are rewarded for behaving passively and 
penalized for behaving assertively, and thus these penalties and rewards are part of the outcomes 
of females’ passive or assertive actions.  Another example: the gender wage gap means that 
women can expect lower wages than men can expect, and hence the outcomes expected by 
women from market work are discounted as compared to those of similarly placed men by the 
degree of the wage gap.  These expectations are constraints that motivate individuals’ behavior 
in ways that tend to reinforce the expectations.  Women tend to take more responsibility for 
unpaid domestic work, since the opportunity cost of paid work is lower than for men, but the 
result is a greater expectation that women will be less committed workers in the paid workforce. 
 The structural theory of rational choice assumes that agents behave rationally in the sense 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the Social Sciences,” in  The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of the social sciences, Stephen 
P. Turner and Paul A. Roth, eds.,  Malden, MA : Blackwell Pub., 2003. Malden, MA : 
Blackwell Pub., 2003, ch.11. 
28 The structural theory of rational choice derives in the big picture, if not in the details, from the 
interpretation of rational choice theory offered by Debra Satz and John Ferejohn, “Rational 
Choice and Social Theory,” Journal of Philosophy, vol.91, Feb. 1994: 71-87. 
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that they choose actions that maximize their (induced) expected utilities.  In this theory, 
individuals are interpreted as abstract members of social groups, which are determined by the 
reward structures of laws, norms, traditions and stereotypes that discriminate by group 
membership.  Groups and the motivations they induce can be seen to supervene on individuals; 
mental states, thus meeting the ontological criteria.  The structural theory of rational choice aims 
to examine how social structures motivate normal behavior and differentially reward individuals 
based on their social status.   From such analyses, we can see how social structures might be 
changed to liberate persons from their ascribed, non-voluntary, group membership, or how to 
make that group membership neutral with respect to their outcomes vis-a-vis other groups.  In 
this way the axiological pragmatic criterion can be addressed.  Arguments for changing social 
structures depend also on moral and political premises that rational choice theory cannot provide.  
But rational choice theory can recommend the means to those ends. 
 The structural theory of rational choice suggests that institutional stable strategies are 
played out by social groups.  This is a structural explanation, but not a functionalist one.  
Structural rational choice theory is a third interpretation of the mathematical model of game 
theory that is often referred to as rational choice theory by philosophers and social scientists.  
Under the individual psychological interpretation of rational choice theory the mechanism that 
allows individuals to choose optimizing strategies is rational deliberation, in the evolutionary 
case it is natural selection, and at the institutional level it is a combination of these mechanisms.  
In some cases rational deliberation is the appropriate interpretation, such as collective action and 
conspiracy, in other cases conventions can be seen to evolve by the fact that less successful 
strategies are selected out because enough individuals violate the conventions to cause them to 
change over time when the cost of violating is outweighed by the cost of maintaining. 
 Structural rational choice theory explains the maintenance of oppression as the 
maintenance of unjust social conventions and social practices by individuals who are motivated 
by those conventions and practices to act to maintain them.  Yet these conventions and practices 
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can change when enough individuals in the oppressed groups or the privileged groups are 
motivated by rewards external to the convention to violate them.  We can supplement structural 
rational choice by a moral theory that allows us to pick out oppression in the full normative 
sense, and that holds the individual to be morally primary.  Thus, structural rational choice can 
both explain the endurance of oppression and give us a place to start to end it. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 In this paper I have argued that certain crucial normative concepts, of which oppression is 
a paradigm case, require the political philosopher and the social scientist, to engage in empirical 
investigation to construct an explanatory theory that is morally relevant.  This implies that the 
theories of such concepts must be held to standards set by both the scientific/explanatory and the 
moral/political aims.  I have offered four categories of criteria, including two: axiological 
pragmatic and moral criteria, which challenge the principle of value neutrality.  These criteria of 
adequacy are then to be used to narrow the field of competitor theories.  On these criteria a 
number of popular explanatory theories of oppression can be eliminated from consideration, 
including recognition theories, psychoanalytic theories, and evolutionary psychology.  Finally I 
argued that structural rational choice theory meets the necessary criteria of adequacy, and thus 
deserves to be further tested empirically and compared with other theories that may meet the 
moral and axiological pragmatic criteria. 
 
*Earlier versions of this paper were presented at University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 
Canada, 13 March 2004 and at the Philosophy of Social Science Roundtable in St. Louis, 
Missouri, 20 March 2004.  I thank audiences and participants at both sessions.  I am 
particularly grateful for suggestions for revision made by Alison Wylie, Paul Roth, and James 
Bohman. 
